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I. INTRODUCTION
The content of out-of-court statements of occurrence witnesses
made to law enforcement officials are often offered by the government
in criminal trials to explain police conduct in relation to a criminal
investigation. These statements typically are admitted for a purpose
other than for their truth, pursuant to Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' In many federal courts and in a number of state courts, these
out-of-court statements are used regularly as a way to circumvent the
rules against hearsay, with the ringing endorsement of judges. Thus,
prosecutors are permitted to bring to the jury's attention the substance of
out-of-court assertions either directly or inferentially. The willingness
of the federal courts and some state courts to embrace even the most
blatant forms of hearsay under the rubric of nonhearsay, while applying
at best, minimal scrutiny, eviscerates not only the integrity of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence but also compromises defendants' Sixth Amend-
ment right of confrontation under the United States Constitution.
This Comment examines the risks involved in admitting such testi-
mony and advocating techniques and options for ameliorating such risks.
It is the position of the author that prior to allowing the content of such
statements as nonhearsay, courts should apply not only minimum thresh-
old tests of relevance, but also determine that there is sufficient proba-
tive value to outweigh unfair prejudice to the defendant. An example of
this standard is found in Illinois:
The trial judge first must determine whether the out-of-court words,
offered for some purpose other than their truth, have any relevance to
an issue in the case. If they do, the judge then must weigh the rele-
vance of the words for the declared nonhearsay purpose against the
risk of unfair prejudice and possible misuse by the jury. . 2
The level of scrutiny utilized by the courts is inconsistent, as stan-
dards and approaches vary wildly between jurisdictions.' While the
methodology used by Illinois goes a long way towards achieving a desir-
I. FED. R. EVID. 801.
2. People v. Warlick, 707 N.E. 2d 214, 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citing People v. Cameron,
546 N.E. 2d 259 (Il. App. Ct. 1989)).
3. Compare Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000) with United States v. Linwood, 142
F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1998).
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able level of scrutiny to determine the appropriateness of admitting the
content of out-of-court statements made by occurrence witnesses, it
lacks the additional rigor of a requirement of enhanced relevance that is
triggered when the defendant has "opened the door" concerning a police
investigation. Such additional scrutiny may be easily defended: Height-
ened standards would assist in clarifying a growing morass of conflict-
ing views and standards that result at times in confusion that is evident
in the courts. The current approach of many jurisdictions permits the
content of out of court statements that, although perhaps relevant, are
often far outweighed in their probative value by unfair prejudice.
Statements offered for a reason other than for their truth are not
hearsay as defined under Rule 801 and are therefore not caught by the
rule against hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 802. Rule 802 pro-
vides that hearsay is not admissible unless it falls under a prescribed
hearsay exception.4 Allowing testimony regarding the content of an
informant's out-of-court statement often involves statements having
hearsay components. Indeed, the content of such out of court statements
may at times have no authentic nonhearsay component, depending on
the context, the trial issues and the reasons advanced by counsel for
permitting such statements.
II. THE RISK OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE
The hearsay risk in this area is at its most troublesome when the
content of out-of-court statements is permitted that addresses a matter
going to the heart of a trial, either directly or by way of inference. For
example, where testimony is permitted as nonhearsay to the effect that
the defendant was engaged in the criminal act for which he is charged,
the prosecution's burden of proof is diluted.
Marginally relevant nonhearsay evidence should not be considered
sufficient on its own to be permitted merely because it arises in the con-
text of a police investigation. Testimony that relies on this type of
nonhearsay evidence is all too frequently used as a means to permit the
introduction of damaging hearsay evidence involving the substance of
an out of court statement made by a third party. While the hearsay evi-
dence may be relevant, without the nonhearsay component, the evidence
would have been excluded. Such testimony is highly prejudicial and
should not be heard by a jury.
The jury is likely to consider such testimony for its truth, with
resulting prejudice to the defendant, where such testimony has a hearsay
component but where the basis of its admissibility is for a purpose other
4. FED. R. EvID. 802.
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than for its truth.5 Jurors, in spite of their best intentions, may have
enormous difficulty in not being swayed by testimony that on its face
implicates the defendant and goes to the heart of the issue of the defen-
dant's guilt. This improper use of nonhearsay occurs by the jury, not-
withstanding the jury being given a Federal Rule of Evidence 105
limiting instruction by the judge on the proper and improper use of such
testimony.6
There are a multitude of concerns that arise from allowing testi-
mony by a government witness that recounts an extrajudicial conversa-
tion between an occurrence witness and a government agent. One such
concern relates to the probative value of the offered testimony. If indeed
such testimony has any probative value, it is often far outweighed by the
unfair prejudice to the defendant. By allowing such statements, a defen-
dant has little opportunity to contain the damage resulting from such
testimony.
This is not to say that out-of-court statements pertaining to a crimi-
nal investigation should never be permitted or that they are always of
low probative value. Indeed, such statements should be permitted, when
they are relevant and of sufficient probative value. In the absence of
special circumstances and the existence of independent relevance, such
as an issue of improper investigative methods, however, these state-
ments ought not be admitted. All too often, the relevance of out of court
statements is found by judges to exist in the police investigation itself,
where no special circumstances or issues exist, and the relevance is
therefore bootstrapped to the police investigation itself-hardly
satisfactory.7
One judge has commented:
[N]o court has explained why investigative background is not hearsay
or is necessary or even helpful to jurors in a criminal trial. Jurors
need not revisit the government's preliminary investigative processes,
especially when such low-value evidence comes at such a high price
to the accused. For prosecutors determined to present such low-value
evidence, they should at least have to produce the out-of-court declar-
ant for cross examination or demonstrate his or her unavailability.'
5. See United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 62 (2d Cir. 1995). "The government's
identification of a relevant non-hearsay use for such evidence, however, is insufficient to justify
the admission if the jury is likely to consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with
significant resultant prejudice." Id. at 71 (citing United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir.
1994)).
6. FED. R. EvID. 105.
7. See United States v. Lazcano, 881 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Freeman,
816 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1987).
8. United States v, Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., concurring in
part, and dissenting in part).
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The testimony should be elicited from the informant in court, who
would therefore be subject to cross-examination. Alternatively, as
espoused by Chief Judge Merritt in Martin, where a prosecution witness
is unavailable, the prosecution should be required to demonstrate the
unavailability of the witness because of all the risks and unreliability of
the hearsay testimony.9 This is so notwithstanding that such testimony
is offered for a purpose other than for the truth of the statement.
III. HYPOTHETICAL CASES
Hypothetical A: An assault and armed robbery takes place in a
neighborhood of Sunny Town. There are no witnesses other than the
victim, who is in a coma. The police subsequently receive a tip from a
confidential informant that the person responsible for the offense com-
mitted a similar crime two months ago and a description and address is
provided. The police have no other suspects and the person named by
the informant is subsequently charged. In his trial the police wish to
testify to the informant's statement regarding the previous crime.
Hypothetical B: Agent Orange has been acting under cover,
investigating a drug operation for some weeks. He receives a tip from a
confidential informant that he is in danger and that one of the dealers, X,
had announced that he would be carrying a gun the next time he was
scheduled to meet Agent Orange. In response to what he has been told,
Agent Orange arms himself in preparation for the next meeting with X as
a precautionary measure. At the next meeting, Agent Orange observes X
reach inside his jacket. Agent Orange shoots and wounds the suspect
and subsequently places him under arrest.
In both hypotheticals, the government wishes to introduce testi-
mony regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of the defendant,
including the content of the informants' out-of-court statements. To
determine whether the testimony presented in either hypotheticals is
admissible as nonhearsay, it is necessary at the outset to determine the
logical and legal relevancy of the testimony. If the testimony is irrele-
vant, this ends the inquiry and the statement is inadmissible. 1' If a
determination is made that the out-of-court statement contained in each
hypothetical is relevant, the next step required in the analysis to deter-
mine admissibility is whether the statement is unfairly prejudicial and
therefore inadmissible. 12 Norman M. Garland offers a useful step-by-
step analysis in determining admissibility, relating to logical rele-
9. Martin, 897 F.2d at 1374.
10. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
11. See FED. R. EvIo. 402.
12. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
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vancy. 13 These are:
(1) What is the evidence? (2) What is the evidence offered to prove?
(3) Does the evidence help? This third question may, for ease of
analysis, be broken into two subdivisions: (a) Does the evidence
offered tend to make some assertion of fact at issue in the case more
or less likely to be true, than if the evidence is not admitted?; (b)
How does the evidence tend to prove that for which it is offered? (4)
Even if the evidence helps, is its probative value (i.e., its ability to
prove an assertion of fact at issue) substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, possibility of mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence? This question,
presented in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, requires a balancing of
the costs and benefits of logically relevant evidence .... These first
four questions constitute the analysis for logical relevance and the
Rule 403 balancing test. 14
The remaining questions applicable to whether these hypotheticals
constitute nonhearsay concern legal relevancy ask, "(5) Is the evidence a
statement? (6) If so, is the evidence of the statement offered for the
truth of the matter asserted (or, alternatively, does the statement have to
be true to be probative)?"' 5
If the answer to questions (5) and (6) is answered in the affirmative,
the statements are hearsay and are irrelevant other than for their truth,
and therefore are inadmissible as nonhearsay. Applying this analysis to
Hypothetical A, the informant's statement describing another crime that
occurred weeks before, in order to link the offender involved in that
crime with the defendant involved in the recent offense is irrelevant. It
is pure hearsay as the statement's only probative purpose is for its truth,
viz., that it is the belief of an out-of-court declarant, not available for
cross examination, that the most recent armed robbery was committed
by the defendant. The statement is classic hearsay, and is therefore inad-
missible, in addition to raising Federal Rule of Evidence 40416 inadmis-
sibility issues, in so far as the statement is offered to show the propensity
of the defendant to commit the present crime from proof of a past crime.
There is no issue concerning the former crime to imbue the informant's
statement with any nonhearsay relevance. By contrast, in Hypothetical
B, the informant's out-of-court statement to Agent Orange, is admissi-
ble, because the events leading up to the arrest are now in issue and
13. Norman M. Garland, An Overview of Relevance and Hearsay: A Nine Step Analytical
Guide, 22 S.W. U.L. REV. 1039 (1993).
14. Id. at 1039-40.
15. Id. at 1040.
16. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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relevant. The statement is introduced for a purpose other than for its
truth, viz., the effect on listener with regard to the subsequent conduct of
Agent Orange in firing on the suspect.
Generally, where an out-of-court statement is offered to show the
emotional or mental effect upon a listener, it would not be objectionable
as hearsay, because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
but rather offered by the proponent as circumstantial evidence of the
state of mind of the listener.' 7 These statements may be admitted to
show that a listener had knowledge of, or received notice of, a fact as a
result of a particular statement having been made that was heard or read
by the listener. i8
Where, for instance, in an assault or homicide case, there is an issue
of self-defense, an out-of-court statement made to the defendant that the
victim threatened the defendant's life would be admissible to show that
the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of danger. Whether such
threat is communicated directly or indirectly to the defendant, it would
still be admissible as nonhearsay for the purpose of showing the defen-
dant's state of mind.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ADMITTING EXTRAJUDICIAL
TESTIMONY CONCERNING POLICE INVESTIGATION
AS NONHEARSAY
There are three main perspectives found presently in the courts for
allowing out-of-court statements to be admitted as nonhearsay. They
have varying appeal and may be appropriate in some contexts, but not in
others. They can be summarized as:
A. Not permitting testimony to the substance of occurrence wit-
ness's statements where the sole relevance of such testimony is as
background information relating to police investigation;"
B. The Old Chief school of thought that allows the substance of
occurrence witness's statements as background information relating
to police investigation; 20
17. United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1998). "Every statement that is
made by someone other than the declarant while testifying at trial could, in theory, be used for the
truth of the matter asserted. The fact of the matter, however, is that not every potentially hearsay
statement is inadmissible, for there will often be a non-hearsay use for it" (emphasis in original).
18. See Kelley v. Airborn Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 345-46 (1st Cir. 1998) ("we agree that
a customer complaint offered to show, for example, that a decision maker had notice of the
complaint, rather than to prove the specific misconduct alleged in the complaint, is not barred by
the hearsay rule."); see also United States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1985); FED. R. EvID.
801 (c).
19. State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990); People v. Warlick, 707 N.E.2d 214 (II1. App.
3d 1998).
20. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
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C. Subjecting testimony concerning police investigation to an
"upon information received" formulation (or similar limitation).2 '
A. The Case Against Allowing Testimony of Content of an
Occurrence Witness's Testimony as Background
Admission of information received by a police officer in the
investigation of a crime, on the basis that such information explains
the officer's presence and conduct and therefore does not constitute
hearsay evidence, is an area of widespread abuse .... Such informa-
tion frequently has an impermissible hearsay aspect as well as a per-
missible nonhearsay aspect, and the court in determining
admissibility should balance the need of the evidence for the proper
purpose against the danger of improper use of the evidence by the
jury. The fact that an officer acted on information received in an out-
of-court assertion may be relevant to explain his conduct, but this fact
should not become a passkey to bring before the jury the substance of
the out-of-court information that would otherwise be barred by the
hearsay rule.2 2
In State v. Broadway,23 the Supreme Court of Louisiana was very
critical of the prosecutor's conduct in eliciting testimony that it consid-
ered to be hearsay. The case concerned the shooting and killing of a
police officer and the shooting of a store manager while they were
depositing the store's takings at the drive-in window of a bank.24 Dur-
ing trial, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to present testimony
from two police officers concerning the content of one of a codefend-
ant's statements that identified the defendant as involved in the mur-
der.25 The court found the admission of the codefendant's statements
constituted significant error. 26 The presence of other evidence, however,
was found to render it harmless error.27
When an out-of-court statement, such as information received by a
police officer during an investigation of a crime, has both an impermissi-
ble hearsay aspect and a permissible nonhearsay aspect, the issue of rele-
vancy becomes significantly interrelated with the hearsay issue. If the
nonhearsay content of the statement has little or no relevance, then the
statement should generally be excluded on both relevance and hearsay
grounds. Marginally relevant nonhearsay evidence should not be used
21. Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
22. State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801, 808 (La. 1999)(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 809.
24. Id. at 805.
25. Id. at 806.
26. Id. at 810.
27. Id. at 818.
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as a vehicle to permit the introduction of highly relevant and highly
prejudicial hearsay evidence which consists of the substance of an out-
of-court assertion that was not made under oath and is not subject to
cross-examination at trial.28
Absent some unique circumstances in which the explanation of pur-
pose is probative evidence of a contested fact, such hearsay evidence
should not be admitted under an "explanation" exception. The proba-
tive value of the mere fact that an out-of-court declaration was made
is generally outweighed greatly by the likelihood that the jury will
consider the statement for the truth of the matter asserted. 9
Of the existing approaches to the problem of allowing the content
of out of court statements of occurrence witnesses, this approach is the
most enlightened and that which arrives closest at upholding the intent
of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the United States
Constitution.
B. The Case in Favor of Allowing Unlimited Testimony Regarding
Background to a Criminal Investigation:
The Old Chief Theory
The defendant in Old Chief0 was charged with violating a federal
statute that prohibited possession of a firearm by any person who had
been convicted of a felony. 3 Johnny Lynn Old Chief, the defendant,
offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a felony and that the
government had proven one of the essential elements of the offense with
which he was charged. 2 The government rejected the defendant's offer
in favor of proving the offense by introducing a record of the defen-
dant's prior conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury.33
The district court agreed with the government, and over renewed objec-
tion, permitted the government to introduce the evidence of the prior
conviction.34
In a five-four split, Justice Souter announced the opinion of the
Court in Old Chief holding that the trial court had abused its discretion
by allowing the defendant's conviction on the basis that "the risk of
unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative
value of the record of conviction. ' 35 This was particularly true because
28. Id. at 808 (emphasis omitted).
29. Id. at 809.
30. 519 U.S. 172, (1997).
31. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174.
32. Id. at 174.
33. Id. at 177.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 191.
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the defendant had not testified, therefore Federal Rule of Evidence 609
was not applicable as there was no justification for introducing evidence
relating to his conviction for impeachment.36
Justice Souter distinguished between situations "when proof of con-
vict status [was] at issue" 37 where:
"there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary signifi-
cance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of
the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence.
For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the
prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguisha-
ble only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the
other."
3 8
Old Chief contrasted the situation of proving felony status from the
usual entitlement of the government "to prove its case free from any
defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away. . . ,,39 The Court
concluded that in a criminal case, the jury is entitled to know the whole
story behind the arrest of a defendant, and thus by implication sanc-
tioned the introduction of out-of-court statements in recounting the story
leading to an arrest.40
The majority described the prosecutor as being entitled to some lat-
itude in presenting a complete picture to the jury or risk the jury penaliz-
ing "the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative infereAce
against that party."'4' "[A] defendant's Rule 403 objection offering to
concede a point generally cannot prevail over the Government's choice
to offer evidence showing guilt and all the circumstances surrounding
the offense."4
Although the Court was careful to state that "[w]hile our discussion
has been general because of the general wording of Rule 403, our hold-
ing is limited to cases involving proof of felon status, 4 3 the decision has
been used as a launching pad to justify virtually unlimited testimony by
the government in the criminal context to explain the background of a
police investigation.
In making an assumption about built-in relevance in the story itself,
the decision in Old Chief has been taken out of its narrow context and
36. FED. R. Ev[D. 609.
37. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 192.
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id. at 192.
41. Id. at 188 (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1019
(1970)).
42. Id. at 183.
43. Id. at 183 n.7.
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used by many courts, in particular, the federal courts, to justify dispens-
ing with any real scrutiny of the content of an extrajudicial statement for
its relevance prior to its admission. This movement represents the
broadest approach seen in the courts and, in effect, offers a green light to
virtually all extrajudicial statements made by an occurrence witness and
offered by government witnesses as background information. Taking
this approach, courts often fail to scrutinize a statement for its relevance
and potential unfair prejudice, as required by Rules 401 and 403, aside
from providing the background story of the police investigation. The
risk inherent in that approach is that it results in statements constituting
classic hearsay being admitted as nonhearsay with regularity because
there is little or no screening for independent relevance.44 Such hearsay
is inadmissible.45
In United States v. Reyes, the circuit court observed:
It is true, as the Government contends, that, in some instances,
information possessed by investigating agents is received at trial not
for the truth of the matter, but as "background" to explain the investi-
gation, or to show an agent's state of mind so that the jury will under-
stand the reasons for the agent's subsequent actions. Such evidence
can be helpful in clarifying non-controversial matter without causing
unfair prejudice on significant disputed matters. In other instances, it
can constitute appropriate rebuttal to initiatives launched by the
defendant . . . The proffer of such evidence generally raises two
questions: first, whether the non-hearsay purpose by which the evi-
dence is sought to be justified is relevant, i.e., whether it supports or
diminishes the likelihood of any fact "that is of consequence to the
determination of the action," and second, whether the probative value
of this evidence for its non-hearsay purpose is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the impermissible hearsay
use of the declarant's statement.46
Contrary to the Supreme Court's position in Old Chief, there are
many good reasons why testimony to the content of an extrajudicial
statement made by a third party, not under oath, and not subject to cross-
examination, would not be sufficient without more to admit it.47 The
44. See United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gonzalez,
967 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1992).
45. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
46. United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
47. "People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing
chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story's truth can feel put upon at
being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have heard. A
convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural
sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is never more
than second best... [T]he prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell
a continuous story..." Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189-190.
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court may be criticized for having lost sight of which of the parties is in
need of protection; the defendant's rights are protected by Rule 401 and
403, and by the United States Constitution, and it is the defendant who
risks incarceration or the death penalty upon conviction.
In fact, the defendant is under a cloud of negative inference from
the beginning of a trial, even before anybody has opened his or her
mouth. This arises from the defendant's very presence in court as the
person accused. The police, it is assumed, would not have wasted their
time and resources on this person unless he or she is the "one." That in
itself is a powerful negative inference and is a powerful counterbalance
to the presumption of innocence. The United States Supreme Court
should be more concerned with negative inferences drawn against the
defendant than with a possible negative inference that may be drawn
against the prosecution should it be deprived of being able to recount the
whole story of their investigation.
In federal courts, the position taken by the Court in Old Chief is
followed and, consequently, it is generally regarded in those courts that
an out-of-court statement relating to police investigation is sufficient in
itself to provide the necessary relevance, to background information,
without further inquiry prior to allowing admission.48 In those courts
that incorporate this view of out-of-court statements, there are few that
actually consider it necessary to perform any type of evaluation pursuant
to the criteria in Rules 401 and 403 for relevance and prejudice.49
Where such an evaluation is made in assessing admissibility, the balanc-
ing scale is already tipped in favor of admitting the testimony offered.
As a consequence, testimony is regularly admitted which is not rel-
evant, or if relevant, is of insufficient probative value. This problem is
compounded by the appeal courts frequently failing to reverse and
remand a case where irrelevant out-of-court statements have been admit-
ted as nonhearsay, or where perhaps relevant, unfairly prejudicial in
effect.5°
In reaching a finding of relevance, the courts may, and do, stretch
48. See United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1987) ("out-of-court
statements are not hearsay when offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a Government
investigation was undertaken."); United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 1984) (cited
with approval in United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 1993)). "When statements by
an out-of-court declarant are admitted as background, they are properly so admitted not as proof
of the truth of the matters asserted but rather to show circumstances surrounding the events,
providing explanation for such matters as the understanding or intent with which certain acts were
performed." Pedroza, 750 F.2d at 200 (citing United States v. Lubrano, 529 F.2d 663, 637 (2d
Cir. 1975)); see, e.g., United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 1982).
49. United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
50. See United States v. Lazcano, 881 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989).
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the concept of relevance beyond all recognition thereby undermining its
application. Where error is recognized by the appellate courts, the
courts sometimes find the error to be harmless on the grounds that, not-
withstanding that an out-of-court statement may have been irrelevant, it
was cumulative in effect, and, therefore, was not determinative in the
jury reaching its decision.5 A finding of harmless error, however, begs
the question and fails to address the underlying problem of federal and
some state courts admitting irrelevant out-of-court statements as
nonhearsay without proper scrutiny.
The greater the likelihood of prejudice resulting from the jury's
misuse of the statement, the greater the justification needed to introduce
the "background" evidence for its nonhearsay uses.
The Reyes court concluded:
Questions involved in the determination of the relevance and
importance of such evidence include: (i) Does the background or
state of mind evidence contribute to the proof of the defendant's
guilt? (ii) If so, how important is it to the jury's understanding of the
issues? (iii) Can the needed explanation of background or state of
mind be adequately communicated by other less prejudicial evidence
or by instructions? (iv) Has the defendant engaged in a tactic that
justifiably opens the door to such evidence to avoid prejudice to the
Government?
Questions involved in the assessment of potential prejudice
include: (v) Does the declaration address an important disputed issue
in the trial? Is the same information shown by other uncontested evi-
dence? (vi) Was the statement made by a knowledgeable declarant
so that it is likely to be credited by the jury? (vii) Will the declarant
testify at trial, thus rendering him available for cross examination? If
so, will he testify to the same effect as the out-of-court statement? Is
the out-of-court statement admissible in any event as a prior consis-
tent, or inconsistent statement? (viii) Can curative or limiting
instructions effectively protect against misuse or prejudice? 52
The potential for abuse by the prosecution in being permitted by the
court to recount to the jury the background of the police investigation, or
to impart sufficient information for the jury to be able to infer the
desired content from the police testimony and context, is completely
ignored by the Court in Old Chief. It is a danger, notwithstanding the
subsequent holding of Old Chief, that has not gone totally unrecognized
by certain judges in a few of the federal courts.
In United States v. Martin,3 an investigation had been conducted
51. See State v. Broadway, 753 So. 2d 801 (La. 1999).
52. Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70-71.
53. 897 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1990).
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by the United States Secret Service and the Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral of the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") into suspected
illicit food stamp trafficking.54 The defendant was the general manager
of a corporation that had been under government contract to distribute
USDA food stamps in several Kentucky counties. 55 At trial, an under-
cover agent was permitted to testify to a government informant's state-
ment naming the defendant as being involved in the food stamp
trafficking.56
The defendant appealed, contending that the statement constituted
inadmissible hearsay, and violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights.57 The Sixth Circuit found that the statement was not hearsay
because it "was offered for the limited purpose of explaining how and
why the investigation began."58
In rejecting the majority's justification for allowing the statements
as nonhearsay, Chief Judge Merritt stated:
Had Martin claimed some form of investigatory or prosecutorial mis-
conduct, such as lack of probable cause, then the majority's argument
would have greater force ... Otherwise, it is difficult to see what
value the out-of-court statements would retain except to inform jurors
that an out-of-court declarant not subject to cross-examination
believed that Martin was a food-stamp trafficker.59
Martin typifies the kind of testimony admitted on a regular basis in
the federal courts. In his criticisms, Chief Judge Merritt identified one
of the critical requirements to be satisfied prior to admitting testimony
characterized as nonhearsay, relevance. The investigation or circum-
stances surrounding the arrest should be in issue prior to allowing such
testimony.60
However, the cases in which nonhearsay relating to police investi-
gations are admitted, demonstrate few such instances of relevance. Mar-
tin is one of the many examples where testimony has been admitted as
nonhearsay where it was not relevant, and therefore ought to have been
excluded as inadmissible.
A determination by the court should be made in all cases as to
whether, in regards to the issues being tried, the testimony is really being
offered for its truth. If so, it is therefore inadmissible and unfairly preju-
54. Id. at 1369.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1370.
57. Id. at 1371.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1374 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 1374 (Merritt, C.J., concurring in part dissenting in part) (commenting that
before low-value evidence is admitted, it should be at issue before being introduced.)
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dicial. To admit statements as nonhearsay where either not relevant, or
where relevant but unfairly prejudicial, constitute harmful error beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is therefore imperative that such statements be
scrutinized by all courts, as a matter of course, for their probative value
and relevance. It is a matter that is not dealt with by the Court in Old
Chief
C. Restricting Admissibility of Background Information:
"Upon Information Received" Formulation
Certain state courts, including Florida6 and Illinois,6" consider tes-
timony as to the content of an occurrence witness's extrajudicial state-
ment relating to police investigation, far from being inherently relevant,
is inherently prejudicial because of the hearsay dangers in addition to the
danger of misuse by the jury for its truth. Consequently, the response of
these courts has been to tend to restrict testimony in this context to refer-
ence to "on information received, " without allowing reference to
content:
"[W]hen the only relevance of such a statement is to show a logical
sequence of events leading up to an arrest, the better practice is to allow
the officer to state that he acted upon a 'tip' or 'information received,'
without going into the details of the accusatory information."63 Where
there is no other relevance other than to show a logical sequence "the
need for the evidence is slight and the likelihood of misuse is great."64
While this approach is preferable to those courts that conform to the Old
Chief sanction of providing the background to a police investigation, it
does not go far enough and raises its own problems. The following
cases illustrate a level of awareness of certain of these problems.
In People v. Warlick,65 testimony had been allowed as nonhearsay
of a radio call received by one of the police officers reporting "burglary
in progress" and "intruder on premises."66 One of the issues considered
by the appellate court was whether this constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The state argued that the testimony was not hearsay because it had been
offered, not for its truth, but rather to provide an explanation of the
61. See Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000).
62. "The trial judge first must determine whether the out-of-court words, offered for some
purpose other than their truth, have any relevance to an issue in the case. If they do, the judge
then must weigh the relevance of the words for the declared nonhearsay purpose against the risk
of unfair prejudice and possible misuse by the jury ... Police procedure or not, when the words go
to 'the very essence of the dispute,' the scale tips against admissibility." People v. Warlick, 707
N.E. 2d 214, 218 (I1. Ct. App. 1998).
63. Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(citations omitted).
64. Id. at 413-14.
65. 707 N.E. 2d 214 (I11. App. 3d, 1998).
66. Id. at 217.
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police officer's investigative procedure.67
In reaching its decision, the court was concerned with the issue of
nonhearsay in Illinois courts, which, they observed, "keeps turning up in
our cases." 68 The court commented:
Invocation of phrases such as "investigative steps" or "police proce-
dure" or "course of the investigation" should not be used as a substi-
tute for principled analysis when the contents of a message, call, or
other out-of-court statement is offered. The claim that the words are
not being offered for their truth does not foreclose further inquiry.69
In Keen v. State,70 the defendant had been convicted and sentenced
for the first-degree murder of his wife. There had been two retrials fol-
lowing appeal and in the second retrial, the defendant was convicted
again and sentenced to death. One of the defendant's claims of error
was that hearsay had been improperly admitted, resulting in harmful
error causing a mistrial.71 In reaching its decision, the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed its prior rulings in Wilding v. State,72 Conley v. State,73
and State v. Baird,74 concerning their treatment of out-of-court state-
ments containing accusatory information against the defendant.
In Baird, the defendant had been charged with multiple counts of
bookmaking and racketeering.75 In reply to the state's question as to
why the defendant had been investigated at that time, a special agent
was permitted to testify that he had "received information that [the
defendant] was a major gambler and operating a major gambling opera-
tion in the Pensacola area."76 The prosecution justified the testimony on
the basis that it established the agent's motive in initiating the
investigation.77
The Baird court rejected this argument on the basis that the agent's
motive was not in issue as "no evidence of selective prosecution or bad
motives" had been made by the defense at the time the testimony was
elicited.78
[Wihen the only purpose for admitting testimony relating accusatory
information received from an informant is to show a logical sequence
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 218.
70. 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000).
71. Id. at 266-271.
72. 674 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1996).
73. 620 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1993).
74. 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990).
75. Id. at 905.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 907.
78. Id.
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of events leading up to an arrest, the need for the evidence is slight
and the likelihood of misuse is great.79
The court stated that when the logical sequence of events is the only
relevance of a statement, "the better practice is to allow the officer to
state that he acted upon a 'tip' or 'information received,' without going
into the details of the accusatory information."80
The Florida Supreme Court in Keen was concerned with the risk of
impermissible inferences from testimony, amounting to hearsay. This
case shows a degree of scrutiny that is without precedent in the federal
courts, which, as we have seen, regularly admits substantive accusatory
statements against the defendant as nonhearsay, even where clearly irrel-
evant to the matters in issue and/or unfairly prejudicial and clearly
including hearsay.8
[W]here "the inescapable inference from testimony [concerning a tip
received by police] is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the
police with evidence of the defendant's guilt, the testimony is hear-
say, and the defendant's right of confrontation is defeated, notwith-
standing that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness
are not repeated. 82
The court in Keen reached the same conclusion that it had in Wild-
ing,83 concerning the dangers of inferences concerning the defendant's
guilt. In both cases, the probative value was found to be outweighed by
unfair prejudice. In Wilding, the court held that testimony that the police
had received an anonymous tip naming the defendant "in connection
with the murder" was reversible error. In so doing, the court rejected the
state's argument that the testimony was admissible to show a logical
sequence of events.
The Keen court ruled that the out-of-court statement inferring the
defendant's guilt was "classic hearsay" for the reason that "[w]hen the
only possible relevance of an out-of court statement is directed to the
truth of the matters stated by a declarant, the subject matter is classic
hearsay even though the proponent of such evidence seeks to clothe such
hearsay under a nonhearsay label."84 The admission of such testimony
was also found by the Florida Supreme Court to compromise the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights:
[It is impermissible for the State to have the benefit of statements
from mystery witnesses or sources without the defendant having the
79. Id. at 908.
80. Id.
81. See Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000).
82. Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
83. 674 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1996).
84. Keen, 775 So. 2d at 273.
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right of confrontation and cross-examination. "In short, the insidious
diminution of the precious rights of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion, through some literal application of the rule against hearsay, can-
not be tolerated. ' 85
Even where offered in an abbreviated form, as in Florida, omitting
any reference to the content of an out-of-court statement, such testimony
may still implicate the rule against hearsay because of the possibility
that the jury will infer content from such testimony. This would thereby
raise relevance and unfair prejudice concerns. While this is not always
the case, it is another element in the equation deserving of the courts'
attention in determining whether to permit an out-of-court statement as
nonhearsay.
V. CLOSING THE BARN DOOR AFTER THE HORSE HAS BOLTED:
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
"The effectiveness of a limiting instruction has been characterized
as trying to 'unring a bell' and as 'a mental gymnastic which is beyond
not only [the jury's] powers, but anybody else's."'86
The role of the cautionary instruction is to restrict a jury to properly
consider a statement's nonhearsay purpose where a statement has a
potentially dual identity of both a hearsay and nonhearsay purpose. If a
statement is hearsay, and the nonhearsay purpose is a mere pretext for
having the statement admitted, free of cross examination, and without a
proper inquiry into relevance and the danger of unfair prejudice, a court
has no business admitting such a statement. No limiting instruction tak-
ing on the role of a so-called "curative instruction" can make it not
hearsay.
"A chameleon-like factor reviewing courts look to in assessing
potential prejudice is the existence of a curative instruction. Potentially
determinative, it is the court's direction that distinguishes [non-hearsay]
...from hearsay for the jury."87 This ought not be the function of the
cautionary statement. It should certainly not be viewed as determinative
or curative and should not be used as a substitute for sound, principled
scrutiny prior to admitting testimony as nonhearsay. By its mere utter-
ance, a cautionary statement used as a curative instruction does not
transform an essentially hearsay statement to a nonhearsay statement.
85. Id. at 273 (citing Postell, 398 So. 2d at 856).
86. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105.1, at 84 (4th ed. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1977) and Nash v. United States, 54
F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
87. United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, (7th Cir 1998) (citing United States v. Lovelace,
123 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1997)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
As a result of the courts allowing irrelevant testimony for an
improper purpose, the minds of juries are regularly poisoned, or, at the
very least, tainted and improperly influenced. These jurors hear substan-
tive statements going to the heart of an issue at trial from the mouths of
the police witnesses that meet neither of Rules 401 or 403, and that often
include hearsay.
Contrary to what some courts would like to believe is the almost
incantative and magical cautionary instruction to the jury at trial which
has the power to banish from their minds and memories what they have
heard from prosecution witnesses, the instruction cannot undo what the
jury has heard. This includes, for instance, hearing a police witness
recite an out-of-court statement of a confidential informant that contains
the name of the defendant that lead to the defendant's arrest and trial.
There is a risk that such testimony will form the basis of a conviction.
There is debate in the courts as to how effective the cautionary
statement is in achieving this end. In United States v. Trujillo,88 the
Tenth Circuit found that testimony by an FBI agent who had been
assigned to investigate a bank robbery relating witness's descriptions of
the suspect was nonhearsay and was not prepared to entertain the appel-
lant's arguments that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial for the reason
that identification was an issue.
The appellate court stated:
It is clear from the transcript Agent Fitzpatrick's testimony was
offered as evidence of the focus of the FBI investigation, not to prove
the truth of some unavailable witnesses' descriptions of the bank rob-
ber. As such, the testimony was not hearsay ... Moreover, any pos-
sible error was cured by the court's clear instruction to the jury to
limit its consideration of Agent Fitzpatrick's response to how the FBI
was proceeding with its investigation. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Fitzpatrick's testimony.89
United States v. Gonzalez,9 concerned hearsay statements admitted
as nonhearsay regarding a confidential informant's statements concern-
ing the defendant "trafficking in large quantities of heroin and
cocaine."'" Additionally, the arresting officer, Arabit, testified that he
had learned from the informant that the defendant was about to relocate
the heroin. Limiting instructions were made to the jury concerning the
proper use of this testimony, but the defendant argued that such testi-
mony was central to the defendant's conviction, as evidenced by a jury
88. 136 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1998).
89. Id. at 1396 (emphasis added).
90. 967 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 1034.
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note. "During deliberations, the jury asked if they could have access to
the testimony of Officer Arabit about the number of calls he received
indicating there was drug activity by [the defendant.]" 9 2
Despite the note evidencing that the jury, in reaching its verdict,
had improperly considered the arresting officer's testimony for its truth,
the Fifth Circuit found that the jury had been properly instructed. The
court refused to "assume that the jury considered this testimony for an
improper purpose . . . The context makes clear that the testimony was
elicited to establish the reason for the warrantless entry into the Gonza-
lez residence and the evidence was relevant for that purpose."93
The limitations of the effectiveness of the cautionary instruction
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States.94 In
that case, the Court held that permitting a nontestifying codefendant's
extrajudicial hearsay statements in the context of a joint trial was
improper for the reason that there was too great a risk that the jury
would improperly consider these as implicating the defendant, in spite of
cautionary instructions to the jury.95
VI. HEARSAY VS. NONHEARSAY
The rule against hearsay precludes the introduction of extrajudicial
statements at a trial made other than by a declarant while testifying at a
trial or hearing, when offered to prove the truth of the matter being
asserted.96 When extrajudicial statements are offered to show that a par-
ticular statement was made for a reason other than for the truth of the
matter asserted, these statements are not hearsay ("nonhearsay"). These
include statements tending to show the effect of a statement made by
another on a person's subsequent conduct (such as effect on listener).
Whether a disputed statement is hearsay frequently turns on the pur-
pose for which it is offered. If the hearsay rule is to have any force,
courts cannot accept without scrutiny an offering party's representa-
tion that an out-of-court statement is being introduced for a material
non-hearsay purpose. Rather, courts have a responsibility to assess
independently whether the ostensible non-hearsay purpose is valid. 97
Out-of-court statements offered by police officers to explain their
actions in a criminal investigation or the circumstances of an arrest, are
regularly admitted by federal and state courts alike as nonhearsay,
92. Id. at 1035.
93. Id.
94. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
95. Id. at 137.
96. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
97. United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 (3d Cir. 1993).
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
offered for a purpose other than for the truth of the statement.98 These
statements are offered as background, and are often statements made by
a person other than the witness testifying, to explain why he or she pro-
ceeded to the scene of a crime leading to an arrest. A radio call of a
disturbance or reported crime requesting that an officer proceed to a
described location, or upon a tip received, typify the kind of out-of-court
statements offered under the label of nonhearsay.
In many respects, the treatment by the courts of statements by
police witnesses containing information about the course of a police
investigation has alternatively developed into two theories. Some courts
use a new de facto hearsay exception of "investigative explanation."
Other courts classify such statement automatically as nonhearsay when
offered for the "limited" purpose of explaining the background of a
police investigation. The rationale followed depends on the court's
methodology.
The contradictory categorizations of investigative out-of-court
statements as both a hearsay exception and nonhearsay, depending on
the court, epitomizes the state of confusion in this area. The mere fact,
however, that an out-of-court statement was made in these circum-
stances is, by itself, of little probative value. Any probative value is
outweighed greatly by the likelihood of the jury considering the infor-
mation for an improper purpose, i.e., for its truth.
Often, such statements involve double hearsay, where testimony is
offered of an out-of-court statement made by a third party declarant
(whose identity is often not disclosed to the defense, is usually not pre-
sent in court, and therefore not subject to cross examination), in addition
to the witness testifying to an out-of court statement. Additionally, an
out-of-court statement may have a dual hearsay and nonhearsay aspect,
and in these circumstances, the issue of relevance is intertwined with an
issue of hearsay. When the nonhearsay aspect of such a statement has
either marginal or no relevance, it should be excluded on grounds of
both hearsay and relevance. 99
In some state courts, and as a routine practice in most federal cir-
cuit courts, a determination that a statement is not hearsay is sufficient in
the view of many judges to allow the offered statement into evidence
without more scrutiny in relation to police investigations in criminal
cases. This is clearly erroneous and reflects a lack of understanding of
the demands of the Federal Rule of Evidence prior to admitting such
statements. "Indeed, courts often admit evidence of the most damning
98. See United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lazcano, 881
F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989).
99. See State v. Broadway, 753 So.2d 801, 808 (La. 1999).
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kind without any Rule 403 analysis merely because it has been received
for some nonhearsay purpose."' 100 The real issues, glossed over in fed-
eral courts and many state courts, concern whether the evidence is rele-
vant and whether its probative significance is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.'
One observer has recently remarked that in the context of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the routine practice involved in determining
whether a statement is or is not hearsay, "is often a misguided scholastic
inquiry."'0 2 Cole quite correctly points out that it is a simple matter for
the proponent of a particular statement to advance "[a] nonhearsay,
pretextual purpose. . .even though the real purpose is to bring highly
prejudicial evidence to the jury's attention. Indeed, that is often the
point of the whole exercise, which works all too often."' 13
VII. MINIMAL SCRUTINY OF NONHEARSAY ILLUSTRATED
On occasion the failure by the court to consider an out-of-court
statement for relevance prior to allowing it as nonhearsay is due to coun-
sel's failure in making the objection to raise Rules 401 and/or 403 as
grounds for why a particular statement should not be permitted."° At
other times, the error lies with the judge, who fails to perceive Rules 401
or 403 as having any applicability to a statement offered other than for
its truth, and allows this type of statement without any further analysis.
Such misapplication, and in some cases, complete omission in the
application of Rules 401 and 403, results in the dual consequence of
permitting statements that should never be allowed on the basis of their
lack of relevance or where of insufficient probative value. This is com-
pounded by the frequent misunderstandings on the part of some attor-
neys about the nature of hearsay. 0 5
In Harris v. State, °6 the state was permitted to offer statements
made by a confidential informant that identified the defendant as a sup-
plier of illegal narcotics. The trial court had allowed the statements on
the grounds that they were not "exactly hearsay."' 17 The appellate court
reversed and remanded on the basis of reversible error. However, in
100. Jeffrey Cole, The Continuing Riddle of the Federal Hearsay Rule, LITIGATION, Spring
1999, at 15, 16.
101. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
102. Cole, supra note 100, at 16.
103. Id.
104. United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991).
105. People v. Carpenter, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (I1. 1963) (rejecting the objection "frequently
appearing in the trial records before this court" that anything said out of the defendant's presence
is hearsay).
106. 544 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
107. Id.
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making its analysis of the evidence, the court displayed some novel
interpretations of the hearsay rule. The appellate court referred to two
"seeming exceptions" to the hearsay rule, which it described as being
inapplicable to the case at bar. 10 8 These were: "(1) the verbal act doc-
trine; and (2) . . . where it is necessary to show a logical sequence of
events."' 09
As to its first "exception," the court stated that a witness would be
permitted to testify to a confidential informant's statement where "...
the statement is itself a part of the transaction."" 0 The court distin-
guished that situation on the basis that, ". . . the occurrence was com-
plete without the statements of the confidential informant. The
statements were not part of the transaction."'' This improperly extends
the application of the verbal act doctrine and the court, on that basis,
would allow an array of inadmissible hearsay testimony.
While the court is correct in identifying a verbal act doctrine, it is
not correct in identifying the doctrine as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Statements constituting a verbal act are nonhearsay because the
statement is regarded as having independent legal significance. An
agent testifying to his principal's grant of authority to act as his agent
would be an example of a verbal act. No hearsay is involved in that
situation." 2 On the other hand, statements made in the course of con-
versation between drug dealers during a drug sale have no independent
legal significance and thus are classic hearsay, because they are offered
for their truth.
The court described what it termed to be "...[t]he second exception
to the hearsay rule" as involving:
... testimony which may be admissible where it is necessary to show
a logical sequence of events . . . It would have been permissible to
introduce a statement to the effect that the police officers knocked on
the door of the apartment because of something they were told by an
informant. It was not permissible to relate the accusatory remarks of
the informant. Such information is inadmissible hearsay.'
In this instance, the Harris court has gone one step further than
confusing hearsay with nonhearsay. Here, it has minted a brand new
hearsay exception. There is no such "logical sequence" hearsay excep-
tion and, once again, the court impermissibly extends the type of state-
108. Id.
109. Id. 323-324.
110. Id. 323. The "transaction" was a drug sale to a confidential informant by the defendant.
Id.
111. Id. 323-324.
112. GRAHAM, supra note 86, § 801.5, at 208.
113. Harris 544 So. 2d at 324.
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ments allowable.1 14 The verbal act exception is similarly misinterpreted.
Further, the court makes no mention of relevance or unfair prejudice in
its review of the challenged testimony permitted by the trial court. The
appellate court was concerned only with direct hearsay, not with the
inferences arising from reference to an informant's statement to explain
the police investigation. 5
When an out-of-court statement of a third party is offered through a
police witness, instead of eliciting the testimony directly from the
declarant, there should be very solid grounds for allowing such testi-
mony, viz., relevance. Arguably, the prosecution should be required to
demonstrate unavailability of the declarant. In United States v. Lin-
wood," 6 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction where four police
officers had testified, over objection, that the defendant's daughter had
told them that her mother was a drug dealer. The prosecution claimed to
offer the statement "not to prove the truth of the matter being asserted,
but to establish why the defendant reacted as she did upon hearing the
statement."" 7 Judge Coffey stated, "[t]he case law of this Circuit leaves
no doubt that this is a non-hearsay purpose.""' 8 One of the police
officers further testified as to a statement by the daughter indicating the
location of drug money in her mother's apartment, where it was subse-
quently found by the officer. 1 9
The Seventh Circuit was satisfied that the cautionary instruction to
the jury that the statement was offered for the limited purposes of estab-
lishing background facts or showing why one reacted as one did upon
hearing the statement was sufficient to dispel any prejudice. 20 Notwith-
standing the appellate court's agreement with the appellant that the evi-
dence was irrelevant, it refused, however, to consider the appellant's
claim that the evidence was thereby inadmissible. 12 ' The appellate court
rejected the claim for the reason that the appellant had failed to raise an
objection on that specific ground at trial and relevancy was not pressed
by the defendant as a ground for reversal. 2 2 Additionally, the court said
that the daughter was available to be cross-examined by the defendant's
attorney concerning her statements to the police. 12 3
The latter basis for the court's decision is somewhat questionable,
114. See id.
115. Harris, 544 So.2d. at 324.
116. 142 F.3d 418, (7th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 425.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 426.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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given that such availability does not address the issue of for what pur-
pose the testimony was offered. The police investigation was not in any
way challenged for its propriety and its only purpose was therefore for
its truth, rendering the testimony in this form inadmissible hearsay. The
testimony was premature and ought to have been elicited from the
daughter by the prosecution in their evidence in chief. It was irrelevant
as nonhearsay and clearly constituted impermissible hearsay.
VIII. RELEVANCE
As discussed, the lack of relevance of an out-of-court statement
offered regarding a police investigation is one of the fundamental con-
cerns in this area. Information about the course taken in a police investi-
gation is, more often than not, irrelevant to the essential elements of the
crime being tried. Examples of occasions when such testimony would
be relevant include instances where the police are alleged to have
coerced a confession,' 24 made an arrest without probable cause,125 or
where some type of police misconduct in the course of an investigation
is alleged to have occurred. 126
There is support for allowing out-of-court statements about a police
investigation to recount the story of an investigation, and Old Chief car-
ries the banner for this approach.' 217 This carries with it the danger of
lack of scrutiny for relevance as shown in United States v. Lazcano,128 in
which the court looked at the nature of nonhearsay and found that cer-
tain out-of-court statements ".... [were] not hearsay if... offered for the
limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was
undertaken." 12 9
The purpose of explaining why a government investigation
occurred is inadequate without more, however, to supply the necessary
relevance in order to admit an out-of-court statement as nonhearsay. To
be relevant, the testimony should be relevant to a trial issue. The testi-
mony admitted as nonhearsay in Lazcano was classic hearsay, admitted
for its truth; yet, the court managed to find that the statement was not
hearsay:
[t]he statement that the defendant "was from the Herreras from
Durango,". . . was not offered to prove that Mr. Lazcano was indeed
a member of the Herrera family, but rather, to set the context in
which the DEA investigation originated . . . Moreover, the district
124. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985).
125. United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1999).
126. Carter v. State, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
127. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
128. 881 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989).
129. Id. at 407 (quoting United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985)).
[Vol. 55:771
STATEMENTS OF BYSTANDERS
court carefully admonished the jury that it was to consider the infor-
mation ... only for the purpose for which it was offered.1 30
This completed the court's inquiry, without a single utterance con-
cerning relevance or unfair prejudice. It is extraordinary that such a
statement, not only identifying the defendant, but also linking him with
the Herrera crime family, was considered by the court to be nonhearsay,
apparently ending the need for any further inquiry. The court was of the
view that the cautionary instruction made to the jury by the district court
was sufficient to somehow negate any prejudicial effect of the statement,
if any.' 3'
Other federal courts have allowed similar out-of-court statements as
"not hearsay when offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a
Government investigation was undertaken."' 132 In United States v. Free-
man, the defendant had been charged with possession and distribution of
counterfeit $100 notes. A special agent was permitted to testify that he
had been told by a Kansas police officer that a "reliable source had
information regarding [the passing of] counterfeit money."' 133
The court cautioned, however, that "out-of-court statements by
informants offered to explain the background of an investigation, like all
evidence, must be evaluated under the criteria in Fed. R. Evid. Rules 401
and 403 for relevance and to prevent confusion or prejudice on the part
of the jury." 134 Unfortunately, the court did not listen to its own counsel,
and concluded, nevertheless, "the informant's statements were neither
confusing nor prejudicial."13 5
The Freeman court found there was no likelihood of prejudice nor
would the jury be confused by such statements explaining why a police
investigation was instigated.' 36 The informant's statements explained
why it was that agents had two suspects, Grady and Martin, under sur-
veillance on the day that they passed counterfeit money to the defen-
dant. 137 There was no claim of improper grounds for the investigation
and the statement, admitted as nonhearsay, was irrelevant and an addi-
tional example of classic hearsay.
There is a limit even in federal courts, however, to the admission of
such out-of-court statements. In United States v. Cass, 38 the defen-
130. Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 560.
134. Id. at 563.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 127 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 1997).
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dant's husband had filed a missing person report the day that she disap-
peared. 39 The defendant was ultimately convicted of making a false
statement to a federal agent that she had been kidnapped and sexually
assaulted.'4 ° Information was uncovered in the course of investigation
that suggested the defendant was with a boyfriend during the time that
she alleged she had been kidnapped.' 4 1
The court in Cass cited Freeman with approval, finding that multi-
ple out-of-court statements admitted by the trial court as nonhearsay
were inadmissible hearsay:
Here, the hearsay problem is exacerbated because the evidence the
government presented to "explain the course of its investigation" - -
[the defendant's husband's] statements, statements of Dallas F.B.I.
agents, statements of Sonya's employer, etc. - - go to precisely the
issue the government was required to prove - - that Sonya lied about
being kidnapped. Hearsay evidence that directly goes to guilt is par-
ticularly difficult to limit to background purposes.' 42
In a decision that departs from the norm in federal courts regarding
the admission of nonhearsay in the context of a police investigation, the
court in United States v. Williams'4 3 determined that certain statements
admitted by the trial court were inadmissible hearsay, resulting in harm-
ful error. The case concerned a robbery in which two armed men robbed
a bank branch and the pivotal issue was identification. 144 Judge Bauer,
in giving the court's opinion, said:
The government's argument that [Special Agent Johnson's] testi-
mony provides the context for the police investigation and composi-
tion of the photo spread for the identification is misplaced. There is
absolutely no reason for Special Agent Johnson to testify about the
substance of his conversation with the confidential informant and to
explicitly identify Williams in court for the government to explain the
actions taken by the police in their investigation. Context and back-
ground can be established, and are properly established, without the
admission of the confidential informant's hearsay declaration.' 45
The court stated that to allow such statements would have the effect
of creating a risk of misleading the jury by virtue of the prejudicial
139. Id. at 1219.
140. Id. at 1218.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1223 (citing United States v. Brown, 767 F.2d 1078, 1084 (4th Cir. 1985) for the
proposition that it is "error to admit out-of-court statements as 'background' where statements
implicated defendant in charged crime and 'effect of the evidence could only have been a
substantial bolstering of the government's case by inadmissible hearsay').
143. 133 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 1998).
144. Id. at 1048-50.
145. Id. at 1051.
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impact of such out-of-court statements. "[I]ts probative value is far out-
weighed by the prejudice to Williams arising from its admission."'' 46
We are concerned with the strong possibility that the jury made
improper use of the evidence introduced through Special Agent John-
son's testimony, i.e., as concrete proof that Williams did indeed par-
ticipate in the bank robbery. This testimony could give rise to an
inference in the jurors' minds that because a confidential FBI inform-
ant identified Williams as one of the bank robbers, then it must be
true. 1
4 7
That such an improper inference and use was made of the statement
by the jury is made all the more likely by virtue of the case against
Williams being described by the court as "paper thin,"' 4 8 and the jury
still managed to return a conviction against Williams. The court contin-
ued, "[t]here is a clear distinction between an agent testifying about the
fact that he spoke to an informant without disclosing the contents of the
conversation and the agent testifying about the specific contents of the
conversation - which is inadmissible hearsay."'
149
A relatively unusual instance of where an out-of-court statement
allowed by the court as nonhearsay was relevant, and was therefore
admitted properly for a nonhearsay purpose, is United States v. Bow-
ser,150 In that case, an undercover agent was permitted to testify to a
confidential informant's statement to him warning the agent about a
threat made by the defendant against the agent. The defendant was
under surveillance by the agent involving the sale of crack cocaine.51
This testimony by the agent consisted of a warning given to the
agent by an informant that the defendant was armed with a gun during a
drug transaction and that the defendant wanted to kill the agent. The per
curiam opinion of the Tenth Circuit found "that the evidence was not
hearsay because it was not introduced for the purpose of proving defen-
dant carried a gun or intended to kill the agent. The statements were
introduced merely to explain the officer's aggressive conduct towards
the defendant. In that context, the statements were relevant."'' 52
IX. PROBATIVE VALUE AND UNFAIR PREJUDICE
The test for determining whether a statement is unfairly prejudicial
is that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
146. Id. at 1052.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1053.
149. Id. at 1052.
150. 941 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 1021.
152. Id. (citations omitted).
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value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ",'53 Even where relevant,
a statement may not be offered if unfairly prejudicial and not of suffi-
cient probative value, a matter recognized by the Court in Old Chief.
"If, then, relevant evidence is inadmissible in the presence of other evi-
dence related to it, its exclusion must rest not on the ground that the
other evidence has rendered it irrelevant, but on its character as unfairly
prejudicial, cumulative or the like, its relevance notwithstanding.', 5
"Evidence which meets the standard of relevancy, Rule 401, may
nevertheless possess attendant disadvantages of sufficient importance to
call for its exclusion. These disadvantages according to Rule 403 con-
sist of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and
considerations of undue delay, waste of time and the needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence."' 55
An additional disadvantage is the jury's "potential misuse of the
information for substantive purposes."' 56 Thus, this is also a factor that
must be balanced as a potential prejudicial effect.
In United States v. Johnston,'57 the defendants were convicted of
various drug charges. The appellate court found numerous instances of
prosecutorial misconduct and catalogued these instances, remarking
about one of these: '
[T]he "personal knowledge" of "information" regarding a defen-
dant's narcotics activity is never admissible. No prosecutor should
ever ask such a question ... This was not an isolated instance of such
questioning ... Based upon the large number of instances of similar
improper questioning we conclude that the prosecutors intentionally
used such questioning as part of their trial strategy... The questions
were clearly improper and highly prejudicial to the defendants. Pros-
ecutors have an obligation "to refrain from improper methods calcu-
lated to produce a wrongful conviction ...
The court in Linwood stated the test:
So long as the judge is convinced that the potential prejudicial effect
of the jury considering testimony for a hearsay purpose does not sub-
stantially outweigh the probativity of the testimony's intended non-
hearsay use it is within his broad discretion to admit the evidence into
the record, provided that a limiting instruction is given upon
request. 159
153. FED. R. EvID. 403.
154. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997).
155. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, supra note 86, §403.1 at 247.
156. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
157. 127 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1997).
158. Id. at 395-396 (citations omitted).
159. United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1998).
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While the test propounded by the court correctly sets out the ele-
ments that must be balanced, the court incorrectly applied it. In Lin-
wood, the statement had no relevance, and that being the case, the
question of unfair prejudice should not have been reached, because the
out-of-court statement should have been inadmissible on the grounds of
relevance.
X. USE OF TESTIMONY NONHEARSAY IN CLOSING STATEMENTS
Federal courts and some state courts have gone further and allowed
the prosecution to refer to out-of-court statements in their closing argu-
ments. Those courts apparently fail to see any inconsistency in allowing
testimony as nonhearsay and then permitting the prosecution to refer to
it for its truth. This creates prejudicial and reversible error.
The practice of the federal courts in this area creates a convenient
loophole for the prosecution in federal court. Courts in allowing state-
ments under the guise of nonhearsay, which pertain to the defendant's
guilt in order to prove the crime charged, thereby afford the prosecution
an opportunity to circumvent its burden of proof.
That burden of proof, of course, requires that the prosecution prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apparently, the
federal courts consider themselves exempt from such concerns. Some
defendants, however, may end up literally paying with their lives as a
consequence of the cavalier approach of the federal courts to the issues
surrounding nonhearsay.
In Illinois v. Godina,160 the defendant had been convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder. On appeal by the defendant, the court reversed and
remanded. 16' One of the grounds of appeal was that the defendant had
been denied a fair trial because the state had been allowed to introduce
highly prejudicial hearsay testimony. 6 ' This included testimony by a
police officer that he had learned from an informant that the defendant
had been in the area after the shooting had occurred and had subse-
quently left to board a Greyhound bus. 163
The officer testified that the defendant was subsequently arrested in
Saint Louis.' 64 The prosecutor further referred to this testimony in her
closing statement in order to infer guilt from the defendant's flight from
the area. The court agreed with the defendant that he had been
prejudiced by this testimony, which was classic hearsay, all the more so
160. 584 N.E. 2d 523 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
161. Id. at 524.
162. Id. at 527.
163. Id. at 527-29.
164. Id. at 527.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
because the defendant had alleged self defense, which the impermissible
inference of guilt negated. 165
It is evident from this discussion that numerous dangers are
presented in treating nonhearsay as admissible, either on the basis of the
newly minted rules of evidence developed by the courts that we have
observed, or on Old Chief-type theory, that the whole story ought to be
recounted to the jury or risk a negative inference. This area is alarm-
ingly bereft of any consistency in application of the rules concerning
evidence, unfair prejudice and hearsay.
In bending the rules of evidence beyond all recognition, the courts
are exhibiting either contempt or disregard for the rights of defendants.
Further, by doing so, the prosecution escapes its burden of proof that
requires that the government prove every element beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some defendants may end up literally paying with their lives as a
consequence of the approach of many courts to the issues surrounding
nonhearsay in the area of police investigation. "In short, the insidious
diminution of the precious rights of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion, through some literal application of the rule against hearsay, cannot
be tolerated."' 166
XI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Federal Rules of Evidence demand more in
regards to testing for relevance than the position taken by the Court in
Old Chief. It is insufficient that the background be deemed to contain
sufficient information in and of itself to supply the requisite relevance to
permit out-of-court statements relating to a defendant's arrest.
As has been shown, this invites prosecutorial abuse and com-
promises the defendant's rights. An out-of-court statement should only
be permitted where it is independently relevant, viz, where there is an
issue concerning the circumstances leading to an arrest. Anything less
165. Id. at 529 ("Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because the party against
whom they are offered has no opportunity to test the credibility of the declarant by cross-
examining the declarant . . .It was prejudicial error for the prosecutor to argue the substantive
value of the hearsay evidence to the jury ... It was additional prejudicial error for the prosecutor
to infer Godina's guilt by flight ... If a prosecutor takes improper advantage of the admissibility
of evidence by offering it for a limited purpose, and once it is admitted, makes impermissible use
of it during closing argument, that impermissible use will be deemed flagrant and grounds for
reversal ...Ultimately, the issue of whether Godina's belief that he acted in self-defense was
reasonable or unreasonable should have been decided by the jury based solely on competent
evidence. Furthermore, the hearsay testimony concerning Godina's flight, coupled with the
prosecutor's improper inference of guilt based upon the hearsay testimony, was the glue that
bonded together all the circumstantial evidence of the case") (citation omitted).
166. Keen v. State 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000) (citing Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851, 856 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981)).
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than a complete assessment for relevance is improper and leads to the
admission of inadmissible hearsay statements, dressed up as nonhearsay
on a regular basis in the federal courts and many state courts.
To permit testimony of the content of extrajudicial statements relat-
ing to a police investigation where no special circumstance exists is
unsatisfactory. At the very least, minimal standards should be applied
by the courts to ensure that testimony regarding a police investigation is
of sufficient probative value, and that such testimony is relevant. A
requirement of the defendant opening the door should be incorporated in
these standards. Cautionary instructions ought not be viewed as a quick-
fix because this simply begs the question of whether testimony should
have been admitted in the first place.
The Old Chief viewpoint is far too sweeping and inclusive. Back-
ground to a police investigation is not relevant merely because it is back-
ground. That is patently insufficient. This is an area that demands
attention because the defendant is far too often unfairly prejudiced by
the content of out of court statements of occurrence witnesses which
comprise inadmissible hearsay statements. If minimal scrutiny were
applied, this would not and should not be admitted. Much more than
minimal scrutiny is advocated, however, which would entail a much
stricter scrutiny and the requirement of the defendant having opened the
door prior to the court giving consideration to permitting the content of
out of court statements to be heard by a jury.
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